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If anything has been learned about 
memory, it is that it is fragile and error 
prone (Schacter, 2001; Loftus, 2005). Far 
from being a verbatim record of the past, 
memory is well understood as a recon-
structive process replete with distortions, 
and at times, gross inaccuracies. Although 
often associated with negative conse-
quences (Wells and Olson, 2003; McNally 
and Geraerts, 2009) there is growing evi-
dence to suggest that memory’s imperfec-
tions may also be a virtue (Schacter, 2012; 
Schacter et al., 2011). The reconstructive 
nature of memory is believed to provide 
greater cognitive flexibility (Schacter and 
Addis, 2007), underlie mental time travel 
(Schacter et al., 2008; Szpunar, 2010), 
and support the construction and main-
tenance of self-identity and life-stories 
(Greenwald, 1980; Markus and Nurius, 
1986; Bruner, 1991; Baerger and McAdams, 
1999; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; 
Wilson and Ross, 2001). We argue here that 
memory’s malleability benefits more than 
just the self – the same attitudes, schemata, 
and social and physical environments that 
render an individual’s memory unique can 
also transform initially disparate memories 
into shared recollections. It is our proposi-
tion that autobiographical memories are 
simultaneously reconstructed to be distinct 
from that of another person and converge 
with it as a result of social interactions. 
Through this convergence, emerges collec-
tive memory that will in turn establish a 
collective identity and promote sociality. 
Our aim here is to bridge the gap between 
individual and collective memory by dis-
cussing several lines of research elucidating 
the processes by which the malleability of 
memory promotes the formation of shared 
memories.
The psychological sTudy of 
collecTive memory
Collective memories are a community’s 
shared renderings of the past that help shape 
its collective identity (Halbwachs, 1950). 
From this perspective, they are the collec-
tive variant of autobiographical memories, 
which are individually held memories that 
help shape personal identity. The identity-
constructing function of collective memo-
ries implies that not all shared memories 
are collective memories. That is, a memory 
can only be considered collective if it is 
widely shared and if it helps to define and 
bind together a group (Assmann, 1995). 
For example, Americans are, to a degree, 
Americans because they possess shared 
renderings of the past, and Americans dif-
fer from Russians, in part, because the two 
hold different shared memories for similar 
historical events. For instance, these two 
nations remember War World II differ-
ently. Americans tend to remember D-Day 
as being the most important battle of the 
war; Russians remember the most important 
battle as the Battle of Leningrad (Wertsch, 
2002). Their different memories help shape 
the way Russians and Americans see their 
place in the world and how they conceive 
of themselves as a nation.
Whereas psychologists have largely 
remained on the sidelines of collective mem-
ory research, the last few years has evidenced 
a growing body of literature relevant to the 
psychological study of collective memory 
(Cuc et al., 2006; Barnier and Sutton, 2008; 
Stone et al., 2010; Coman and Hirst, 2012). 
It seeks to examine the cognitive mecha-
nisms underlying how individual memories 
emerge, spread, and become shared across 
a community. These cognitive mechanisms 
often involve memory distortions, but as we 
shall see, these distortions are often shared 
across community memories, and as a result 
lead to shared memories.
Probably the best understood mecha-
nisms for creating shared memories has been 
discussed in a various ways since Bartlett 
(1932) first introduce the notion of schema. 
He suggested that shared memories may be 
formed through social interactions because 
community members, whom are raised 
together, attend the same school, read the 
same books, and generally share many of the 
same experiences, will possess similar sche-
mata, and in turn will shape the way commu-
nity members remember their past. Take, for 
example, Hastrof and Cantril’s (1954) study 
of Dartmouth and Princeton students’ mem-
ories of a critical football match between the 
two schools; within group memories were 
similar, whereas across the two populations, 
the memories were dissimilar.
Despite these results, it is not always the 
case that a shared culture and shared sche-
mata will dominate the shaping of one’s 
memory. Community members achieve 
their individuality, in part, because they pos-
sess unshared attitudes and schemata. The 
discrepancies, as such, can lead members of 
the same community to remember a shared 
event quite differently. Paradoxically, indi-
vidually distinct memories can still become 
shared over time. What makes us claim that 
memory is well-designed for the formation of 
collective memory is that there are a variety 
of mechanisms and processes that will lead 
to mnemonic convergence, in spite of the 
dissonance that exists among rememberers.
These mechanisms can shape and reshape 
memory through a variety of means. We 
focus here on conversational interactions. 
Although memory may have a number of 
functions (Bluck, 2003), the  communicative 
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function of memory may be uniquely 
human (Pillemer, 1992), and talking about 
the past is a pervasive part of everyday life 
(Hirst and Echterhoff, 2012). Pasupathi et al. 
(2009) found that 62% of events recorded in 
diary entries had already been discussed the 
evening after they had occurred. Similarly, 
Harber and Cohen (2005) found that after 
33 students visited a morgue on a field trip, 
881 people knew of the visit after three 
conversational exchanges had taken place. 
Furthermore, eyewitnesses tend to talk to 
other co-witnesses after witnessing incidents 
(Skagerberg and Wright, 2008).
When investigating how conversations 
shape memory studies to date have focused 
primarily on the impact a speaker has on 
a listener’s memory. Whereas Echterhoff, 
Higgins, and others have focused on the 
reflexive influence a speaker can have on 
reshaping his or her memory, leading to 
mnemonic convergence between speaker 
and listener, a so-called shared reality (Hirst 
and Echterhoff, 2008; Echterhoff et al., 
2009), speakers can have a unilateral influ-
ence on a listener’s memory, leading to a 
similar shared reality.
social conTagion
Through acts of social remembering indi-
viduals become vulnerable to incorporating 
details about the past that they did not actu-
ally experience. That is, conversations can 
serve as a mechanism enabling the spread of 
a memory from one person to another. This 
process is often referred to as social conta-
gion. Social contagion can be traced back 
to the classic work of Loftus and colleagues 
(Echterhoff et al., 2005; Loftus, 2005). 
Although Loftus did not frame her work 
in terms of social contagion research, these 
experiments and others (Loftus, 2005) have 
consistently demonstrated that social inter-
actions (e.g., what an experimenter says to 
a participant) can be an effective means for 
implanting false memories. For example, in 
these studies participants were asked to view 
a series of slides depicting a traffic accident. 
After the initial viewing, an experimenter 
provided them with additional informa-
tion describing the accident, information 
that at times contradicted the content in 
the original images. After the post-event 
information was given to the subject, par-
ticipants were asked to recall what they had 
seen. Across numerous studies Loftus and 
colleagues have demonstrated the ability to 
implant false memories for a wide range of 
events including getting lost in a grocery 
store, knocking over a wedding cake, and 
seeing Hanna–Barbara cartoon figures at 
Disneyland (Loftus, 2005).
Although the implantation of false 
memories often occurred from exposure 
to a social stimuli, studies directly examin-
ing how the effects of social interactions on 
memory have shown that social interactions 
are particularly effective methods for shaping 
memories. For example, Meade and Roediger 
(2002) asked participants to view a complex 
image. Afterward, a confederate discussed 
the image with the participant, providing 
false information relating to the original 
image. Post-discussion, participants were 
asked to individually recollect what they had 
originally seen. Although subjects were more 
likely to incorporate related, novel informa-
tion into their recollections, even unrelated/
unexpected implanted content was included 
and accepted as a valid memory. Wright et al. 
(2000) found that two people unknowingly 
integrated their individual memories of 
slightly different pictures with that of his or 
her peer. Cuc et al. (2006) went even further 
– groups of four were asked to first individu-
ally recollect the story they had just read, and 
then to discuss it with each other, and found 
across several studies that conversations are 
an effective means for transforming how dif-
ferent version of the past can converge into a 
more uniform memory.
The relationship the listener has with the 
speaker impacts what is transmitted within 
the conversation. Individuals are prone to 
conformity; they are not bent on providing 
novel information to a group recollection. 
The rememberers are following the conver-
sational maxim – say no more than is neces-
sary (Grice, 1975). What goes unsaid during 
the initial stages of conversation will be 
less likely to be included in the final shared 
memory. In essence, conversation and by 
extension memory transmission is some-
times a democratic process – frequency of 
participation determines how much influ-
ence one has over the group recollection. 
Put simply, the more one dominates a con-
versation the greater impact they will have 
on shaping the group’s collective memory 
(Cuc et al., 2006), a conversational role 
referred to as the “dominant narrator.” In 
fact, dominant narrators appear to be more 
effective in shaping collective memory than 
perceived experts (Brown et al., 2009).
socially shared reTrieval-
induced forgeTTing
Collective memory is inherently selec-
tive (Rajaram and Pereira-Pasarin, 2010; 
Hirst and Echterhoff, 2012). When people 
recall the past some details are retrieved 
while other fail to enter into conversa-
tion. The consequence of those items not 
retrieved has become of increasing interest 
in understanding how distinct memories 
become increasingly similar across indi-
viduals. Hirst and colleagues (Stone et al., 
2012) have conducted studies applying the 
retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) paradigm 
(Anderson et al., 1994) to social interac-
tions. RIF in individuals consistently show 
that recalling an item inhibits the accessibil-
ity of categorically related information. In 
other words, retrieving a piece of informa-
tion, a part of memory, makes it harder to 
remember unrecalled related information 
than if the individual had not retrieved any 
aspect of that memory at all. Modifying 
this paradigm to social interactions, similar 
patterns were found. That is, when people 
converse about the past evidence of RIF pat-
terns emerge not only for the person doing 
the recalling but for the person listening 
to the speaker as well (socially shared RIF, 
SS-RIF; for a review see Stone et al., 2012). 
Hirst and colleagues posit that this occurs 
when the listeners concurrently retrieves 
with the speaker. SS-RIF has been found in 
free flowing conversations (Cuc et al., 2007), 
flashbulb memories (Coman et al., 2009), 
and in clinical populations (Brown et al., 
2012). Interestingly, this effect was found 
even when speakers and listeners possessed 
similar, but not identical memories. Coman 
et al. (2009) asked individuals, unknown to 
each other, who had been living in New York 
City on 9/11 to recall their memories of that 
day. The results showed unmentioned details 
related to what was recalled became not only 
harder for the speaker to later remember but 
also in the listener as well, even though the 
speaker did not share these exact memories. 
These findings suggest that when people col-
lectively recall the past, the act of retrieval 
has the potential to induce forgetting across 
individuals in similar ways, and like social 
contagion can also be an effective means for 
creating collective memories.
Are there certain conditions that increase 
the probability that a speaker can induce 
forgetting in a listener? A recent study by 
Barber and Mather (2012) found that RIF 
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in speakers and listeners was greater when 
both participants were of the same gender, 
whereas neither the valence of the memory 
exchange (i.e., neutral versus negative) nor 
the age cohort of the participants had sig-
nificant influence on the rate of forgetting. 
Barber and Mather’s (2012) findings suggest 
that affiliation between speaker and listener 
may enhance forgetting. Emotion may also 
play a role. Brown et al. (2012) asked combat 
veterans with and without PTSD to study 
and selectively recall either trauma or neu-
tral stimuli. Although equal levels of for-
getting were found for neutral information, 
individuals with PTSD exhibited greater 
levels of induced forgetting, individually 
and socially, for trauma-related stimuli. 
Future studies will benefit from elucidat-
ing more clearly the conditions when social 
forgetting will and will not occur.
conclusion
This paper has illustrated the capacity for 
memory’s malleability to facilitate social-
ity and transform individual memories 
into shared, and subsequently collective 
memories. The transformation of indi-
vidual memory into collective memory 
can be seen as an emergent and recursive 
system(s). We argue that the mechanisms 
that guide mnemonic convergence are 
in it of themselves social mediators. The 
porous nature of memory helps an indi-
vidual maneuver through a social world 
that consists of an aggregate of autobio-
graphical memories, and in so doing the 
individual as such engenders collective 
remembrance. Coman and Hirst (2012) 
found that mnemonic influences, such as 
social contagion and SS-RIF, are transitive 
and strengthen as they propagate. The plu-
rality of the process is inevitable given the 
multiple environments individuals exist 
within. What begins as a dyadic exchange, 
results in a cohesive network, that is sus-
tained by a multiplicity of convergences 
within and between groups.
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